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In this paper we study neural responses to inequitable distributions of rewards despite
equal performance. We speciﬁcally focus on differences between advantageous inequity
(AI) and disadvantageous inequity (DI). AI and DI were realized in a hyperscanning
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment with pairs of subjects
simultaneously performing a task in adjacent scanners and observing both subjects’
rewards. Results showed (1) hypoactivation of the ventral striatum (VS) under DI but not
under AI; (2) inequity induced activation of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
that was stronger under DI than under AI; (3) correlations between subjective evaluations
of AI evaluation and bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal and left insular activity. Our study
provides neurophysiological evidence for different cognitive processes that occur when
exposed to DI and AI, respectively. One possible interpretation is that any form of inequity
represents a norm violation, but that important differences between AI and DI emerge
from an asymmetric involvement of status concerns.
Keywords: equity norm, social preferences, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), ventral striatum
INTRODUCTION
It is a widely accepted principle of distributive justice that goods
should be distributed to individuals according to their contribu-
tion, i.e., people should receive equal pay for equal work (equity
principle) (Homans, 1961). There are numerous recent exam-
ples for the relevance and pursuit of this form of equity, such
as resistance to pay cuts, efforts to abolish gender discrimina-
tion in salary, or the public debate about the appropriateness
of extremely high wages for managers. Evidence for the behav-
ioral importance of the equity principle comes from a large
body of behavioral economics experiments (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) and has been demonstrated even during early childhood in
humans (Fehr et al., 2008). Behavioral effects of inequity manip-
ulations havealso been demonstrated in non-human species such
as capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and De Waal, 2003)a n dd o g s
(Range et al., 2009).
From an individual perspective, the equity principle can be
violated in two forms, to one’s advantage or to one’s disad-
vantage, respectively. Previous evidence suggests that reactions
to inequity typically differ greatly, depending on whether it is
advantageous or disadvantageous. In a questionnaire study by
Loewenstein et al. (1989) it is shown, e.g., that most subjects
strongly oppose disadvantageous inequity (DI) while reactions to
advantageous inequity (AI) are relatively modest (see also Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). Moreover, it has been shown that evalu-
ating AI requires more cognitive resources than does evaluating
DI (van den Bos et al., 2006). Finally, while several studies on
non-humanprimateshavedemonstrated rejections ofDI,reports
ofanimalsrejecting AI (i.e.,abandoningtheirownadvantage)are
scarce [for a review, see Brosnan (2009)]. These ﬁndings reveal
a fundamental asymmetry between positive and negative viola-
tions of the equity principle, which cannot be explained solely
in terms of inequity aversion: conceptually, inequity aversion
implies an increase of dissatisfaction with increasing inequity,
no matter whether this is to one’s advantage or disadvantage.
In light of the evidence it is, therefore, likely that other motives
are involved in the evaluation of distributional inequity, in par-
ticular status concerns (Heffetz and Frank, 2008)a n dm a t e r i a l
self-interest. Consider, for example, the Ultimatum Game (UG)
(Guth et al., 1982): In the UG, the ﬁrst player (the proposer)
suggests a division of a given amount of money to the second
player (the responder). The responder then decides whether to
accept or reject the proposal. In case of a rejection none of the
players receives any money. Now consider an unequal proposal
(of a pie of, say 10 monetary units, MU) so that the respon-
der receives less than the proposer (say 2:8 MU). Compared to
an equitable distribution (5:5 MU), such an offer simultaneously
violates the equity principle (because it is an unequal distri-
bution), status concerns of the responder (because getting less
puts him in an inferior position) and material self-interest of
the responder (because he receives less money compared to the
equitable distribution). Like in the UG, in many experiments as
well as outside the laboratory, DI simultaneously violates equity
norms, status concerns and notions of self-interest. In contrast,
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in case of AI the equity norm is in conﬂict with status-related
interests and material self-interest: while AI violates the equity
principle, it implies a higher status than in an equitable state.
These theoretical considerations and previous empirical ﬁndings
suggest that (1) DI elicits greater dissatisfaction than AI; (2) DI
violates both the equity norm and status concerns/self-interest,
whereas AI violates only the equity norm; and (3) given that in
AI, equity-oriented norms and status concerns/self-interest are
in conﬂict, AI places higher cognitive demands on evaluative
processing than DI.
Recently, neuroscientiﬁc studies have begun to address neural
processes underlying social and economic phenomena like e.g.,
reactions to norm violations (Hsu et al., 2008), status concerns
(Zink et al., 2008), and reactions to unfair behavior (DeQuervain
et al., 2004). These studies have convergingly identiﬁed brain
regions that are important for these aspects of social behavior.
One consistent ﬁnding is that activations of the dopaminergic
mesolimbic (“reward”) system, especially the nucleus accumbens
(NAcc) do not exclusively reﬂect material self-interest, but also
social aspects. For example, NAcc activity is responsive to social
rewards (Izuma et al., 2008, 2010), to status differences (Zink
et al., 2008; Ly et al., 2011) and to outcomes of others (Fliessbach
et al., 2007; Tricomi et al., 2010). More generally, it has been
shown that NAcc activity is context dependent in many ways,
i.e., it is inﬂuenced not only by the social context, but also by
personal characteristics like own ﬁnancial background (Tobler
et al., 2007), by the previous reward history (Elliott et al., 2000;
Akitsukietal.,2003),orthebysetofalternativeoutcomes (Breiter
et al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Additionally, speciﬁc pre-
frontal brain regions have been shown to mediate responses in
economic transactions. Speciﬁcally, the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) seems to play a critical role in overriding mate-
rial self-interest in favor of punishing unfair behavior in the UG
(Knoch et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2011). Additionally, ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the anterior insula have
been implicated in emotion regulation as an important compo-
nent ofreactions to unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibniaet al.,
2008).
In the present study, we applied functional brain imaging in
order to investigate whether the assumptions outlined above are
supported by neurophysiological data, i.e., whether and how the
observedasymmetry between AIandDIisreﬂected bydifferential
activation of brain regions that are essential for the processing of
rewards and norm violations, speciﬁcally the NAcc, the DLPFC,
VLMPFC, and the anterior insula. In a previous study on 32 male
subjects, we havedemonstrated that paymentinequityprincipally
affectsbrainactivity intheventralstriatum(VS)(Fliessbachetal.,
2007). To address the questions underlying the present study,
i.e., to investigate differences between different types of inequity,
we applied the same experimental procedure and obtained addi-
tional data from a large sample of female subjects (resulting in a
total of 64 subjects). Additionally, we surveyed pleasantness rat-
ings for the different payment conditions from our subjects using
an 11-point Likert scale reaching from −5t o5 .T h i sa l l o w e du s
to correlate brain activity with individual evaluations of different
distributions.
Based on the three outlined assumptions, we hypothesized
that:
(i) ActivityintheVSisreducedmoreinDIthaninAI,reﬂecting
a higher level of dissatisfaction resulting from DI than from
AI.
(ii) Regions that process norm violations, as well as status con-
cerns and self-interest violations (DLPFC, anterior insula)
are differentially affected by DI and AI. While both types of
inequity should activate these areas because they involve a
norm violation, the additional violation of status concerns
in DI should lead to an enhanced increase in activation of
these areas.
(iii) There should be a dissociation of areas associated with the
evaluationofDIandAI(i.e.,displayingcorrelationsbetween
subjects’ ratings and BOLD signal strength). The higher
cognitive demands placed by the simultaneous weighing of
equity and statusconcerns inAI should requirehigher order
cortical processing. In contrast, the evaluation of DI should
predominantly rely on subcortical structures involved in
reward and emotion processing.
METHODS
SUBJECTS
Eighteen pairs of male subjects and 18 pairs of female subjects
participated in the experiment. All subjects were native German-
speakerswithoutanyhistoryofneurologicalorpsychiatric disease
(one subject was subsequently excluded because of a previously
unknown history of schizophrenic psychosis). The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn and
all subjects gave written informed consent. Eight subjects were
excluded from the analysis for various technical reasons (e.g.,
excessive head movement, scanner dysfunction), so that the ﬁnal
analysis includeddatafrom32 femaleindividuals(mean age25.8,
SD 3.9) and 32 male individuals (mean age 29.2, SD 4.9) (30 of
which were scanned on the 1.5 Tesla (T) scanner and 34 on the
3T scanner). All analyses includedcovariates forthe between sub-
ject parameters“scannertype” and“gender”aspotentialnuisance
factors, which did not show any signiﬁcant interaction with the
reported constrasts.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Two subjects were simultaneously placed in two MR scan-
ners situated at opposite sides of the same control room at
the research center. The two subjects saw each other when
being led to the scanners, but they did not have the opportu-
nity to talk to each other or to become acquainted before the
experiment began. The task was presented via video goggles
(Nordic NeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) using Presentation© soft-
ware (NeuroBehavioural Systems, Inc.). During scanning, both
subjects performed 300 trials of the following task (Figure1):
they saw a screen with a varying number (4–55) of blue dots
for 1.5s. The time of the appearance of this screen deﬁned
the task onset. Immediately, thereafter, a number was presented
that differed by 20 percent from the number of dots previ-
ously shown. Subjects had to decide whether the number of dots
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FIGURE 1 | Single-trial settings. Subjects saw a number of blue dots for
1500 ms (screen 1). Immediately afterwards, a number was presented and
subjects had to decide by pressing a button whether the number of dots on
the ﬁrst screen was less than or greater than this number within a time limit
of 1500 ms (screen 2). After a response feedback (250ms, screen 3) and a
short delay (blank screen 4), a feedback screen informed subjects about
their own and the other subject’s performance (correct or incorrect)
together with the respective monetary rewards (screen 5). Here, three
alternative outcomes representing the main conditions for this study are
depicted.
shown ﬁrst was greater or less than the number presented sec-
ond. They indicated their answers with the help of response grips
(NordicNeuroLab, Bergen) within a time limit of 1.5s. Later
responses were counted as incorrect. A response terminated the
screen and the selected option was highlighted for 250ms as
response feedback. The timing parameters were derived from
pretests that showed that on average about 80% of trials were
solved correctly at this level of difﬁculty, resulting in a sufﬁ-
cient number of events for each experimental condition. The
presentation stopped when both subjects had responded, intro-
ducing a variable delay of at most 1500ms for the subject who
responded faster. Once both responses were available,and follow-
ing an approximately 200ms delay for the exchange of response
information between the two presentation computers, a feedback
screen was displayed for 4 s. This screen revealed to both players
whether they were correct (indicated by a green check-mark) or
not (indicated by a red X), as well as the amount of money they
earnedforthattrial.Thenexttrialstartedfollowingajitteredtime
interval of 4.5–7s.
Payoff conditions were as follows: when both subjects were
incorrect, both received nothing. When only one subject was cor-
rect, this subject received either an amount of approximately C30
(low-level) or approximately C60 (high-level) while the other
subject received nothing. When both subjects were correct, one
of six possible payoff conditions was randomly selected, gener-
ated by a 2 × 3 factorial design that varied the absolute amount
of money (factor 1) and the amount relative to the other subject
(factor 2) (see Table 1). In order to reduce boredom that could
result from repeatedly seeing the same monetary ﬁgures, we var-
ied the reward amount in each condition within a 10 percent
interval from the mean (i.e., for the C30 trial, the amounts varied
from C27 to C33). At the end of the experiment, one trial was
randomly selected and paid out according to the respective out-
c o m e si nt h a tt r i a l .O na v e r a g e ,s u b j e c t sr e c e i v e da na d d i t i o n a l
Table 1 | Payoff conditions.
Task Relative Absolute Payoffs Condition
performance reward reward (€) (A–B)
(A/B) level (A:B) level
−/− 0–0 C1
+/− High 60–0 C2 (“win alone”)
Low 30–0 C3
−/+ High 0–60 C4 (“no win”)
Low 0–30 C5
+/+ 1: 2 High 60–120 C6 (DI)
Low 30–60 C7
1: 1 High 60–60 C8 (E)
Low 30–30 C9
2: 1 High 120–60 C10
Low 60–30 C11 (AI)
“−” = incorrect task performance, “+” = correct task performance. Conditions
of interest are highlighted.
C45 resulting from the experiment, together with a show-up
fee of C15, i.e., payoffs from the experiment were relatively
large compared to the show-up fee. The purpose of this was to
ensure a relatively high salience of the reward events during the
experiment.
SCANNING PROCEDURE
Scanning was conducted using a 1.5T Avanto Scanner and a 3T
Trio Scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using standard eight
channel head coils. Slices were in axial orientation and covered
all of the brain including the midbrain but not the entire cerebel-
lum. Scan parameters for the 1.5T scanner were as follows: Slice
thickness: 3mm; interslice gap 0.3mm; matrix size: 64 × 64; ﬁeld
of view: 192 × 192mm; echo time (TE): 50ms; repetition time
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(TR): 2.91s. Scan parameters for the 3T scanner were as follows:
Slicethickness:2mm;interslice gap1mm;matrixsize:128 × 128;
ﬁeld of view: 230 × 230mm; TE: 33ms; TR: 2.5s.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data analysis was
performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8, www.
ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For preprocessing, the functional images
were realigned to the ﬁrst image of each time series and again
realigned to the mean image after the ﬁrst realignment. Images
werethennormalizedtothecanonicalEPItemplateusedinSPM8
and smoothed with an 8mm Gaussian kernel. After normaliza-
tion, images were re-sampled to a voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3mmfor
both scanners,allowingforacombinedanalysisofdatafromboth
scanners.
For modeling the BOLD response, 11 types of events were
deﬁned according to the payoff conditions C1–C11. The onset
times (deﬁned by the appearance of the feedback screen inform-
ing the subjects about the outcome) was convolved with the
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) used in SPM8
and its temporal derivative. Additionally, a regressor for the onset
times of the task was included in the model as well as move-
ment parameters derived from the motion correction procedure.
Parameter images for the contrasts for each single condition were
generated for each subject and were then subjected to a second-
level random effects analysis. We (1) investigated the main effects
of inequity [F-contrast for conditions C6, C8, C11, and differen-
tial T-contrasts C6 > C8 (DI > E) and C11 > C8 (AI > E)] on
brain activity; and (2) tested for correlations of the self-reported
inequity aversion measures and the respective BOLD contrasts.
According to ourhypotheses these were conducted for the VSand
for the whole brain.
REGION OF INTEREST DEFINITIONS
Based on a priori considerations, we were speciﬁcally inter-
ested in the VS. A region of interest in the VS was deﬁned
functionally by contrasting the conditions in which one sub-
ject received a reward and the other did not (C2, C3) with the
conditions in which a subject did not receive any reward at
all (C1, C4, C5) on a relative conservative statistical threshold
(Voxelwise FWE-whole brain corrected P < 0.05). This resulted
in a bilateral ventral striatal ROI with peak voxels at X = 18,
Y = 11, Z =− 8 (number of voxels: 120) and X =− 9, Y = 8,
Z =− 5( n = 144), respectively. We assumed that this ROI def-
inition would ensure that we would consider all striatal areas that
show (under our study and pre-processing conditions) a clear
sensitivity to rewards. Alternatively, we applied an anatomical
mask for the NAcc from the Harvard-Oxfordcortical and subcor-
tical structural atlas (http://www.cma.mgh.harvard.edu) apply-
ing a probability of 0.5. For these two regions of interest (shown
in Figure2), parameter estimates were extracted and averaged
over all voxels in the entire ROI, allowing for statistics based
on conventional statistical thresholds without the need to cor-
rect for multiple comparisons (except the number of conducted
tests).
THRESHOLDING
For the whole-brain analyses of the main effects of inequity
and the correlational analysis we used a cluster corrected
PFWE < 0.005 (in order to correct for the number of con-
trasts), after an inclusion threshold of P < 0.001 unc). Here,
the diagrams depicting mean parameter estimates (Figure7)
or scatter plots (Figure8) were derived from the peak voxels
(plus a surrounding 5mm sphere) of the so identiﬁed clus-
ters. Note that this serves demonstration purposes only and
that no statistical inferences rely on these analyses. Note fur-
ther, that the post-hoc calculation of correlation coefﬁcients for
the so identiﬁed regions bears the danger of overestimation,
because the regions revealing highest effects are selectively ana-
lyzed.
PLEASANTNESS RATING
Three to six months following the fMRI scanning session, the
same subjects were asked to rate the pleasantness of each experi-
mental payoff condition on an 11-point Likert scale (“On a scale
from from −5 (this bothers me very much) to +5( t h i sm a k e s
me very happy) how would you evaluate these events?”). These
pleasantness ratings allowedusto deﬁnetwomeasuresofinequity
aversion analogously to the BOLD contrasts, i.e., (E-DI) as a
measure for the aversion to DI and (E-AI) as a measure for AI,
respectively. Pleasantness ratings fromtwomalesubjects werenot
obtainable.
Our experiment offers an ideal setting to test for the neu-
ral consequences of violations of the equity principle for several
reasons: ﬁrst, it allows us to disentangle effects of equity norm
violations from status concerns and self-interest violations. The
realization of DI and AI within person allows us to assess the
effect of equity norm violation with or without simultaneous sta-
tus concern violations (DI vs. AI). It also allows ruling out the
inﬂuence of material self-interest, because each of the conditions,
DI, AI, and equity (E), were realized in the same subject, keeping
the subject’s own absolute income constant. Second, allocations
FIGURE 2 | ROI Masks. In red: Voxels within the striatum which show a reward-related signal (derived from the contrast C2, C3 > C1, C4, and C5) on a
PFWE < 0.05 (per voxel), whole brain corrected. In blue: anatomically deﬁned NAcc mask (according to Harvard-Oxford brain atlas).
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were not implemented by another person [such as in the UG
(Guth et al., 1982)] but were randomly assigned by a computer.
Therefore, reactions to inequity were not confounded by the per-
ceived fairness or fairness intention of the other person. Third,
subjects could not take action to reduce inequity (again unlike
in the UG or other fairness experiments). This means that brain
activity did not reﬂect experience or expectation of behavioral
reactions to the observed inequity.
RESULTS
PLEASANTNESS RATINGS (FIGURE 3)
Our ﬁrst result uses data from the post-experimental question-
naire where subjects had to rate the pleasantness of different
allocations. On average, subjects strongly preferred E over DI
(mean ratings ± SEM: 4.0 ± 1.2f o rEv s .1 .3 ± 3.0f o rD I ,t63 =
FIGURE 3 | Mean pleasantness ratings for the conditions DI
(own income/other’s income: 60/120), E (60/60), and AI (60/30).
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM). ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.001 (dependent samples t-tests).
7.1, p < 10−8) demonstrating a strong and systematic aversion
toward DI. Not a single subject preferred DI over E (i.e., no sub-
ject preferred a better outcome for the other person for a given
ownabsoluteincomelevel,whichcouldbeinterpreted asanaltru-
istic preference). On average, there was also a preference for E
over AI (mean ratings ± SEM: 4.0 ± 1.2f o rEv s .3 .5 ± 1.7f o r
AI,t63 = 2.3, p = 0.024),buthere, differences were much smaller
and less consistent between subjects, i.e., 16 subjects preferred E
over AI, nine preferred AI over E, and the rest of subjects was
indifferent in this respect. These ﬁndings closely match previous
results (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
HYPOTHESIS 1: EFFECTS OF INEQUITY ON VS ACTIVITY
(FIGURES 4, 5, 6)
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of inequity in the VS
ROI [within-subject ANOVA: (F(2, 59) = 8.26, P < 0.001)]. Pair-
wise comparisons showed that the DI condition was associated
with a signiﬁcantly weaker activity compared to both condi-
tions E (t63 = 2.76, p = 0.007) and AI (t63 = 3.56, p < 0.001).
Interestingly, activity in the VS was higher for AI than for E,
albeit insigniﬁcantly. Similar results are obtained when applying
an anatomically deﬁned ROI mask (Figure5). We also tested for
associations between BOLDsignalchanges in the VS andindivid-
ual pleasantness ratings and observed a signiﬁcant but relatively
weak relationship (Figure6).
HYPOTHESIS 2: EFFECTS OF INEQUITY IN OTHER BRAIN
REGIONS (FIGURE 7)
Outside the VS, a signiﬁcant effect of DI (contrast DI > E) of
reward was observed in the right DLPFC (Figure6). Post-hoc
paired t-tests for parameter estimates derived from the peak voxel
of this activation shows increased activation in this area also for
AI, but this activity was signiﬁcantly lower than for DI.
On the statistical threshold used for the whole brain analyses
there was no signiﬁcant effect observed for AI > E.
FIGURE 4 | Results for the ventral striatum. Left: Brain images
showing signiﬁcantly (P < 0.005 for demonstration purposes) higher
activation for E than DI (peakvoxel MNI-coordinates: X =− 6, Y = 14,
Z =− 5), and for AI than for DI (X =− 12, Y = 11, Z =− 5), within the
functionally deﬁned ROI. Right: The barplot shows mean parameter
estimates for the different conditions averaged across all voxels of the
functionally deﬁned ROI. The left side demonstrates the strong
responsiveness of the area to rewards per se (which was the selection
criterion for the ROI, implying circularity of this result). The right side shows a
signiﬁcant main effect of relative payoff on activation in this area
[within-subject ANOVA: (F(2, 59) = 8.26, P < 0.001)] with stronger acvtivation
in the equity (t63 = 2.76, P = 0.007) and advantageous inequity (t = 3.56,
P < 0.001) condition than for the disadvantageous inequity condition. Note
that these contrasts are independent of the ROI deﬁning contrasts. Error bars
indicate standard error of means and are not informative with regard to
(within-subjects) statistical inference.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 165 | 5Fliessbach et al. Neural responses to inequity
HYPOTHESIS 3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE BOLD SIGNAL
AND PLEASANTNESS RATINGS OUTSIDE THE VS (FIGURE 8)
Outside the VS, signiﬁcant correlations between pleasantness
ratingsandBOLDcontrastswereobservedonlyfortheAI-Ecom-
parison and that bilaterally in the VLPFC and in the left insula
(Figure5).
For the DI-E comparison no signiﬁcant correlations were
found at the statistical threshold deﬁned for the whole brain
analysis.
In all cases correlations were positive, i.e., greater activation
was associated with higher pleasantness ratings. There were no
signiﬁcant negative correlations between BOLD activations and
pleasantness ratings.
GENDER DIFFERENCES
The equallysized groups of maleand female subjects in our study
sample provide a good basis to analyze gender effects of inequity
FIGURE 5 | Results for the anatomically deﬁned ROI: Mean parameter
estimates for the different conditions averaged across all voxels of the
ROI (cf. Figure 3). The left side demonstrates the strong responsiveness of
the area to rewards per se. The right side shows a signiﬁcant main effect of
relative payoff on activation in this area [within-subject ANOVA:
(F(2, 59) = 6.556, P = 0.008)] with stronger activation in the E (t63 = 2.32,
P = 0.023) and advantageous inequity (t = 2.92, P < 0.001) condition than
for the disadvantageous inequity condition. Error bars indicate standard
error of means and are not informative with regard to (within-subjects)
statistical inference.
processing. However, neither the behavioral results (ratings of
inequity conditions) nor the described neuroimaging ﬁndings
showed any signiﬁcant interaction between inequity conditions
and gender.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the neural consequences of viola-
tions of the equity principle. Speciﬁcally, we tested for differences
between responses to DI and AI. Our results show that:
(i) VS activity is reduced for conditions of DI but not for AI.
(ii) Disadvantageous (and to a lower extend also advantageous)
inequity increases activation in the right DLPFC.
(iii) TheevaluationofAIisrelated toventrolateralprefrontaland
insular regions.
ad (i): On the basis of converging evidence that VS activity
increases with increasing expected value of events [for a
summary, see Knutson et al. (2009)] this ﬁnding is con-
sistent with the assumption that relative to E, DI causes
dissatisfaction which is reﬂected by lower VS activity.
Furthermore, there was no indication of a lower level of
satisfaction with AI in the VS. VS activity was actually
slightly higher in the AI condition than in the E condi-
tion, despite the signiﬁcantly lower pleasantness ratings
for AI than for E. Notably, subjects did not explicitly rate
the pleasantness of the different outcomes while in the
scanner. Although the correlations of brain activity with
the ratings (obtained later) suggest that implicit evalua-
tion processes took place during scanning, it seems likely
that subjects did not extensively reﬂect and evaluate the
outcomes at that time, in part given the limited time
available to do so. Therefore, the discrepancy between
the VS activity during scanning and pleasantness ratings,
which were acquired outside the scanner without any
time limitations, might reﬂect the fact that longer peri-
ods of reﬂection lead to more negative assessments of AI,
a ﬁnding that is in line with results from van den Bos
et al., 2006. In addition one may speculate that the ques-
tionnaire ratings reﬂect an element of social desirability
FIGURE 6 | Association of BOLD responses to ratings in the VS
(averaged across all voxels of the functionally deﬁned ROI) and
subjective pleasentness ratings demonstrate a signiﬁcant positive
association between pleasantness and signal for AI evaluation (r = 0.29,
P = 0.01, one-sided) and a non-signiﬁcant trend for DI evaluation
(R = 0.18, P = 0.08, one-sided).
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FIGURE 7 | Whole-brain analysis of the contrast DI > E. Left: Signiﬁcant
activation cluster (cluster corrected PFWE < 0.005, inclusion threshold
P < 0.001 unc.) in the rDLPFC (Peak voxel MNI coordinates X = 48, Y = 29,
Z = 37). The majority of the voxels lie in Brodman Area 9. Right: The bar plot
depicts effects of the different conditions at the peak voxel (plus
surrounding 5mm). Note that this diagram only serves demonstration
reasons. Error bars indicate standard error of means and are not informative
with regard to (within-subjects) statistical inference.
FIGURE 8 | Whole-brain correlational analysis of the contrast E-AI with
the respective difference in the pleasantness rating. Signiﬁcant clusters
(cluster corrected PFWE < 0.005, inclusion threshold P < 0.001 unc.) showing
this relation lie bilaterally in the VLPFC (Peak voxel MNI coordinates: X = 45,
Y = 32, Z = 1, and X =− 57, Y = 35, Z = 1) and in the left insula (X =− 33,
Y = 2, Z =− 2). Right: The scatterplot depicts the relation between contrast
and ratings for the peak voxels averaged across both sides of the VLMPFC
clusters, and serves demonstration reasons only.
or normative pressure: when interviewed subjects may
feel they “should” dislike AI when in fact they don’t.
In this sense our ﬁnding provides an interesting case
where valuations from BOLD signals lead to different
and perhaps more reliable conclusions than valuations
derived from interviews. A similar discrepancy between
ventral striatal responses and behavioral data concerning
distributional inequity was recently reported by Tricomi
et al. (2010), although in this case subjects had reduced
ventral striatal activations in a self-AI condition despite
more favorable ratings, i.e., results were seemingly oppo-
site to ours. The discrepancy between the two ﬁndings
can probably explained by differences in the experimen-
tal design. In our study the two subjects were principally
in the same situation when they were faced with the
unequal distributions. In contrast, Tricomi et al. applied
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a strong inequity manipulation prior to the evaluated
events. Thus, in Tricomi et al.’s study the principal sta-
tus of the subjects was deﬁned before scanning and the
monetary transfers during scanning did not compromise
the superiority of the high-pay subject. We assume that
under these circumstances the superior subjects are more
likelyto payattention to equityconcerns explaining more
negative responses also to AI. This means that the asym-
metry that we assume to underlie DI and AI processing
canbereversedbytheinduction ofastronger priorasym-
metry between the subjects, comparable with a shift in
the reference point. Future studies should address the
highly interesting relation between status and inequity
aversion by manipulating status in inequity experiments
independently from monetary distributions.
Our study provides one example of relative reward pro-
cessing in the human VS, i.e., it demonstrates that
responses to a given reward size critically depend on
contextual, in this case social, factors. It is important to
note that relative reward processing in the VS occurs in
many ways, e.g., the response to a given reward depends
on the set of possible alternatives (Breiter et al., 2001;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005)o ro nr e w a r dh i s t o r y( Elliott
et al., 2000; Akitsuki et al., 2003). Therefore, it will be
an interesting challenge for future studies to investi-
gate even more speciﬁc effects of social comparison on
reward processing, by e.g., adressing social comparison
with regard to performance measures instead of mon-
etary rewards. As another example of relative reward
processing, it has been demonstrated that processing of
monetary rewards depends on the ﬁnancial status of the
subjects (Tobleretal.,2007).Wedidnotexplicitlycontrol
for this factor, but our subjects group is supposedly rela-
tive homogenous (and not representative) in this regard
(stemming from a typical student population) so that
we assume that this factor does not introduce signiﬁcant
noise.However,relatinginequityprocessingto(socioeco-
nomic) status provides another promising goal for future
research.
ad (ii): Generally, the DLPFC is assumed to play a role in goal
maintenance and cognitive control (Mansouri et al.,
2009). In the present study, activation in the DLPFC of
was attributable to the experience of inequity. Previous
studies on ultimatum bargaining suggest that these acti-
vations can be interpreted in terms of registering both
norm and status concern/self-interest violations (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2006).
A well-known imaging study revealed activation of the
MPFC, right DLPFC, and anterior insula when respon-
derswere confronted with unfairoffers in the UG(Sanfey
et al., 2003). A recent study combined fMRI with TMS
and suggested that the right DLPFC is speciﬁcally and
causally involved (together with the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex) in the rejection of unfair offers in the UG
(Baumgartner et al., 2011). Therefore, to clarify the role
of the DLPFC in such complex social behaviors appears
highly interesting.
In the UG, being confronted with an unfair offer implies
several important aspects. First, as outlined in the intro-
duction, it violates equity norms as well as self-interest
andstatusconcerns.Second,becausetheunfairallocation
has been intentionally proposed by another person, it is
likely to induce negative feelings toward the proposer.
Third, because the responder must decide whether to
accept or reject the offer, it involves active decision mak-
ing, e.g., in the form of negative reciprocity. Different
to the UG, our experimental design rules out the sec-
ond and third aspect; it controls for the self-interest
aspect by keeping own income constant; and it allows
to test the effect of equity norm violation with or with-
out violations of status-related interests (DI vs. AI). Our
results showed strong responses to DI in the DLPFC.
Additionally, DLPFC was also activated by AI but sig-
niﬁcantly less than by DI. It did not show activations
when the rewards were equally distributed. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the assumption that both forms of
inequity represent some kind of norm violation, which is
registered in the DLPFC. Further, this result is consistent
withtheconjunctionthattheadditionalviolationofstatus
motivesleadstoafurtherincreaseofactivity incaseofDI.
ad (iii): Our results demonstrate the importance of ventromedial
prefrontal areas along with the insular cortex in the eval-
uation of AI. Generally, these areas have implicated in
emotion processing (insula) (Nitschke et al., 2006)a n d
with cognitive regulation of emotions (VLPFC) (Wager
etal.,2008).Bothregionshav ebeenshownt obein v olv ed
in the processing of unfair offers in the UG (Tabibnia
et al., 2008).
In both areas, greater activity correlated with subjects’
satisfaction with the corresponding outcome. In other
words, people who preferred E over AI (according to the
post-experimental survey) showed greater activity in the
VLPFC and insula during E trials than during AI tri-
als, and those subjects who stated a preference for AI
over E showed greater activity here during AI trials than
during E trials. The data, therefore, do not support the
assumption that a conﬂict between fairness-based cogni-
tiveprocessesandasituationofAIleadsto amodiﬁcation
of an immediate positive evaluation of such an event. If
that was the case, one would expect to ﬁnd a negative
correlation between the level of brain activity for AI tri-
als and evaluation of AI trials. An alternative assumption
could be that VLPFC and insula activation during E tri-
als reﬂects a positive cognitive appraisal of these trials in
subjects who show a strong preference for E. This inter-
pretation would be in line with previous reports that the
VLPFC plays an important role in evaluating norm com-
pliance (Spitzer et al., 2007). It would be interesting to
complement our ﬁndings with methods that allow causal
inferences such as transcranial magnetic stimulation. In
light of our ﬁndings we would expect that disturbance of
rightVLPFCfunction should alter the evaluationofone’s
own social advantages more than the evaluation of one’s
disadvantages.
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Inconclusion,ourstudy providesneurophysiologicalevidence
for the existence of different cognitive processes involved in the
confrontation with DI and AI. Our data are consistent with the
idea that any form of inequity represents a norm violation, but
that differences between DI and AI emerge from the additional
involvement of status-related motives.
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